Inconsistent Jury Verdicts Returned on a Multiple Count Indictment of a Single Defendant by Majewski, Amy L.
INCONSISTENT JURY VERDICTS RETURNED
ON A MULTIPLE COUNT INDICTMENT OF A
SINGLE DEFENDANT
On September 1, 1967, a motor vehicle recklessly operated by Herbert
A. DeSacia forced a Ford Ranchero off the road and into the Chena
River. The driver of the Ranchero and one of his passengers died in
the accident. The State of Alaska charged DeSacia with two counts
of manslaughter. Despite the virtually identical evidence presented
by the prosecutor on both counts, a jury found DeSacia guilty of the
manslaughter of the driver and not guilty of the manslaughter of the
passenger. These seemingly inconsistent verdicts sparked a debate in
Alaska that had already surfaced in other jurisdictions. The debate
over the effect of verdict inconsistency continues and provides the sub-
ject matter of this note.
I. INTRODUCTION
Inconsistent jury verdicts may arise in criminal cases involving
multiple defendants as well as in those involving a single defendant
prosecuted under a multiple or single count indictment.1 An inconsis-
tency is said to exist in such cases when two or more verdicts, or the
jury's findings of fact and its general verdict, lack rational
compatibility.2
English common law courts consistently refused to enter a judg-
ment of conviction on inconsistent jury verdicts.3 The courts adhered
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1. Verdict inconsistency is said to exist in criminal cases involving a single de-
fendant prosecuted under a single count indictment when the jury's factual findings
conflict with its general verdict.
2. See Annotation, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdict as Between Different
Counts of Indictment or Information, 18 A.L.R. 3D 259, 269 (1968).
3. Comment, Inconsistent Verdicts in a Federal Criminal Trial, 60 COLUM. L.
REV. 999, 1001 (1960); see, e.g., Rex v. Woodfall, 98 ENG. REP. 398 (1770) (where
defendant was charged with printing and publishing a seditious libel and jury returned
verdict of "guilty of the printing and publishing only," the court ordered a new trial,
noting that the verdict could be interpreted as inconsistent with jury's factual findings);
The King v. Colson, 87 ENG. REP. 47 (1685) (conviction reversed where defendant
charged with "riotously diverting a watercourse" and jury found defendant guilty of
diverting a watercourse but not guilty of the riot); Regina v. Gray, 17 Cox's CRIM. L.
CAs. 299 (1891) (conviction for obtaining money under false pretenses overturned
because it was "inconsistent" with the jury's finding of no intent to defraud).
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to this rule whether the case involved one defendant and a single ver-
dict,4 one defendant and multiple verdicts,5 or multiple defendants. 6
Unlike their English counterparts, American courts heard few
cases concerning the proper treatment of inconsistent jury verdicts
prior to 1920. Not until the use of multiple count indictments gained
popularity in the early 1920's did the issue receive substantial atten-
tion in the United States. The increased use of multiple count indict-
ments provided the stimulus for far-reaching judicial and legislative
analysis of inconsistent verdicts, particularly with regard to inconsis-
tent verdicts returned by a jury pursuant to the multiple count indict-
ment of a single defendant.
Due to the comprehensive nature of this subject, this note focuses
only on the treatment of inconsistency between an acquittal and a con-
viction returned by a jury at the trial of a single defendant. 7 Part II of
this note examines the federal "rule" that inconsistency between ver-
dicts does not invalidate a conviction and discusses California's ap-
proach to inconsistent verdicts. Part III contains a detailed analysis of
Alaska case law on this subject, beginning with the landmark decision
of DeSacia v. State.8 Finally, Part IV identifies a number of weak-
nesses in Alaska's current approach to verdict inconsistency and con-
cludes with recommendations for the future treatment of inconsistent
verdicts by Alaska courts.
II. THE FEDERAL "RULE" AND THE CALIFORNIA "ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS" APPROACH
A. The Federal "Rule"
As soon as American courts addressed the inconsistent jury ver-
dict issue, a divergence in opinion emerged. 9 Between 1921 and 1929,
the majority of the cases decided by the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits adopted the common law requirement of verdict consistency.' 0
4. Regina v. Gray, 17 Cox's CRIM. L. CAs. 299 (1891); Rex v. Woodfall, 98
ENG. REP. 398 (1770); The King v. Colson, 87 ENG. REP. 47 (1685).
5. The Queen v. Evans, 7 Cox's CRIM. L. CAS. 151 (1856).
6. The Queen v. Manning, 12 Q.B.D. 241 (1883); The Queen v. Thompson, 117
ENG. REP. 1100 (1851); Harison v. Errington, 79 ENG. REP. 1292 (1627).
7. Unless otherwise stated, all references to verdict inconsistency refer to incon-
sistency between an acquittal and a conviction returned by a jury at the trial of a
single defendant.
8. 469 P.2d 369 (Alaska 1970).
9. In 1960, 15 states adhered to the federal rule, which regards verdict inconsis-
tency as immaterial, while 10 states expressly rejected the applicability of that rule
within their jurisdictions. Comment, supra note 3, at 1002 n. 18.
10. See, e.g., Speiller v. United States, 31 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1929); Murphy v.
United States, 18 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1927); Peru v. United States, 4 F.2d 881 (8th Cir.
1925); John Hohenadel Brewing Co. v. United States, 295 F. 489 (3d Cir. 1924);
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The Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, typically
upheld apparently inconsistent verdicts. 1
John Hohenadel Brewing Co. v. United States 12 typifies the ap-
proach to verdict consistency taken by the Third, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits. In that case, an indictment containing seven counts had been
filed against the brewing company. The first six counts alleged the
unlawful manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor, while the sev-
enth count charged the defendant with maintaining a common nui-
sance. The prosecution based the common nuisance charge on the
theory that the defendant maintained his premises for the purpose of
keeping, bartering, and selling intoxicating liquor. The jury acquitted
the defendant on the first six counts and returned a verdict of guilty on
the seventh. The court of appeals affirmed only because "the verdict
of guilty [was] ... based on evidence other than that pleaded in sup-
port of the first six counts." 13 Had the evidence been identical, an
acquittal on the first six counts would have "negatived" the common
nuisance charge and compelled a reversal of the conviction.14
Gozner v. United States 15 exemplifies the position taken by the
Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits with regard to verdict consis-
tency. In Gozner, a multiple count indictment charged the defendant
with possessing property used in the manufacture of intoxicating li-
quor, possessing intoxicating liquor, manufacturing intoxicating li-
quor, and maintaining a common nuisance. Virtually identical
evidence was introduced on each count. The jury found the defendant
not guilty of the charges in the first three counts, but convicted him of
maintaining a common nuisance. In affirming the conviction, the
Sixth Circuit reasoned that each count of an indictment is, "in con-
templation of law, a separate and distinct indictment." 16 Therefore,
the jury's findings on one count do not affect or limit its findings on
any other counts, and inconsistent verdicts may stand.1 7 When a jury
returns inconsistent verdicts, "if it be assumed that one of the verdicts
Baldini v. United States, 286 F. 133 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 749 (1923);
Rosenthal v. United States, 276 F. 714 (9th Cir. 1921). But cf Corbin v. United
States, 205 F. 278, 280 (8th Cir. 1913) ("[T]he withdrawal of one count, by directing a
verdict at the final submission of the case, does not affect the other [counts].").
11. See, e.g., Seiden v. United States, 16 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1926); Gozner v.
United States, 9 F.2d 603 (6th Cir. 1925); Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.
1925); Marshallo v. United States, 298 F. 74 (2d Cir. 1924); Carrignan v. United
States, 290 F. 189 (7th Cir. 1923); see also Gee Woe v. United States, 250 F. 428 (5th
Cir. 1918) (holding that reversal of conviction not required when inconsistency exists).
12. 295 F. 489 (3d Cir. 1924).
13. Id. at 490.
14. Id. at 490-91.
15. 9 F.2d 603 (6th Cir. 1925).




is erroneous, there is at least as much reason to consider the verdict of
innocence incorrect as there is to consider the verdict of guilt
improper."' 8
This conflict among the circuit courts led the United States
Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Dunn v. United States. ' 9 In
Dunn, a multiple count indictment charged the defendant with pos-
sessing intoxicating liquor, selling intoxicating liquor, and maintaining
a common nuisance by keeping intoxicating liquor for sale. At trial,
the prosecution presented identical evidence on all three counts. The
jury found the defendant guilty of maintaining a common nuisance
and acquitted him of the remaining charges. On appeal, the defendant
argued that the jury's return of inconsistent verdicts compelled the
reversal of his conviction. In the defendant's opinion, the circum-
stances of his case required that the jury find him guilty of possessing
intoxicating liquor in order to convict him of maintaining a common
nuisance. 20 The Supreme Court flatly rejected the defendant's position
and declared that compatibility between verdicts returned on a multi-
ple count indictment is not necessary. 21
The Court articulated two separate bases for its decision. The
first basis reflected the Court's belief that each count in an indictment
constituted "a separate indictment. '2 2 In holding that verdict incon-
sistency failed to constitute grounds for the reversal of the defendant's
conviction, the Court reasoned that:
[I]f separate indictments had been presented against the defendant
for possession and for maintenance of a nuisance, and had been sep-
arately tried, the same evidence being offered in support of each, an
acquittal on one could not be pleaded as res judicata of the other.
Where the offenses are separately charged in the counts of a single
indictment the same rule must hold.23
The second rationale espoused by the Court centered around the
historic power of juries to check arbitrary government action by show-
ing leniency to defendants. According to the Court, the lack of consis-
tency between verdicts did not necessarily indicate that the jury was
unconvinced of the defendant's guilt. To the contrary, the jury's re-
turn of inconsistent verdicts may have represented an exercise of leni-
ency. Although the jury had no "right" to return verdicts resulting
from compromise, it did have the "power" to do so. 24 In light of the
18. Id.
19. 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
20. Id. at 391.
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fact that the jury may merely have taken advantage of one of its pow-
ers, and to avoid undue encroachment upon the role of the jury, the
Court permitted the conviction to stand.
After the Supreme Court's holding in Dunn, the courts of appeals
generally adhered to the principle that jury verdicts returned on a
multiple count indictment of a single defendant need not demonstrate
consistency.2 5 Over time, however, some courts began to recognize
exceptions to the rule enunciated in Dunn.26 In 1984, concern over
the validity and extent of these exceptions prompted the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari in United States v. Powell. 2 7
A fifteen count indictment charged Powell with violating federal
narcotics and firearms laws. When the case reached the Supreme
Court, the controversy centered around counts one, three, four, five,
six, and nine.28 Count one charged the defendant with conspiring to
possess cocaine with the intent to distribute the narcotic. Count nine
alleged that the defendant unlawfully possessed cocaine with the intent
to distribute. Counts three through six charged the defendant with
using the telephone to facilitate the crimes charged in counts one and
nine.29 The jury convicted the defendant of counts three, four, and
five and acquitted her of counts one, six, and nine.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the defendant argued that the
court should reverse the telephone facilitation convictions because the
jury's verdicts were incompatible. She insisted that her acquittal on
25. United States v. Cyr, 712 F.2d 729 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Colson,
662 F.2d 1389 (1lth Cir. 1981); United States v. Jacobs, 632 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907
(1980); United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v.
Dennett, 551 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974); United States v. Manglona, 414 F.2d 642
(9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
840 (1968); United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1002 (1967); United States v. Vastine, 363 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1966); Rua v. United
States, 321 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 969 (1964); Downing v.
United States, 157 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1946); Williams v. United States, 151 F.2d 736
(4th Cir. 1945); Telfian v. Sanford, 147 F.2d 945 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 869
(1945); Thomas v. Hudspeth, 127 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1942); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
26. United States v. Brooks, 703 F.2d 1273 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Hannah, 584 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1978). In both Brooks and Hannah, the courts reasoned
that Dunn should not apply because the conspiracy count and the facilitation count
could not be viewed as separate and distinct indictments.
27. 469 U.S. 57 (1984).
28. The jury returned a guilty verdict on only one of the nine counts not in con-
troversy. The defendant was found guilty of giving false information in her petition
for court-appointed counsel. Id. at 59 n.2.
29. 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1982).
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counts one and nine negatived essential elements of the crimes charged
in counts three, four, five, and six. The defendant questioned, for ex-
ample, how one could be convicted of using the telephone to facilitate
a conspiracy without being found guilty of the conspiracy. In this in-
stance, the Ninth Circuit, while claiming to adhere to the Dunn rule,
agreed with the defendant and reversed. 30 The court believed that
cases involving a defendant who was convicted of facilitating a felony
but acquitted of committing that felony called for an exception to the
Dunn rule.31
When Powell reached the Supreme Court, the Court reaffirmed
the principle that jury verdicts may stand despite the lack of rational
compatibility, and declined to recognize exceptions to the Dunn rule.32
Because the Court found a defect in the res judicata rationale behind
the Dunn opinion, 33 the "power of the jury" line of reasoning emerged
as the sole rationale for upholding the Dunn rule. The Powell Court
found that rationale sufficient to support a reversal of the Ninth
Circuit.
According to the Court, the holding in Dunn "embodies a pru-
dent" recognition of several factors.34 First,
inconsistent verdicts ... present a situation where "error," in the
sense that the jury has not followed the court's instructions, most
certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose ox has been gored.
30. United States v. Powell, 708 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 469 U.S. 57
(1984).
31. Id. at 457.
32. Powell, 469 U.S. at 69. The Powell Court specifically stated, however, that it
was not deciding the proper disposition of cases where the defendant is convicted of
two crimes and where a finding of guilt on one count logically excludes a guilty verdict
on the other. Id. at 69 n.8. The court then cited United States v. Daigle, 149 F. Supp.
409 (D.D.C.), aff'dper curiam, 248 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
913 (1958), which required the reversal of guilty verdicts on mutually exclusive
crimes.
33. In Dunn, the Court stated that if "separate indictments had been presented
against the defendant for possession and for maintenance of a nuisance, and had been
separately tried, the same evidence being offered in support of each, an acquittal on
one could not be pleaded as res judicata of the other." 284 U.S. at 393. The Court
then concluded that the rule must also apply when the prosecution uses a multi-count
indictment. Id.
The Powell Court noted that the res judicata analysis in Dunn could no longer
withstand judicial scrutiny. Subsequent to Dunn, the Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of res judicata applied in both criminal and civil cases to preclude the relitiga-
tion of issues covered in a prior verdict even if different offenses were charged. Sealfon
v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578 (1947); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
"[W]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judg-
ment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future law-
suit." Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443.
34. Powell, 469 U.S. at 65.
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Given this uncertainty, and the fact that the government is pre-
cluded from challenging the acquittal, it is hardly satisfactory to
allow the defendant to receive a new trial on the conviction as a
matter of course. Harris v. Riveria... indicates that nothing in the
Constitution would require such a protection.35
Second, the Dunn rule permits juries to check oppressive government
conduct. 36 If the government is unduly harassing a defendant who
appears to be guilty, the jury need not set the defendant free to com-
pensate for the abuse of power by the government. Instead, the jury
may exercise its power to acquit the defendant on some of the charges.
Third, attempts to determine reasons behind the inconsistency on a
case-by-case basis would lead to "pure speculation" or invasions into a
"jury's thought processes." ' 37 Finally, independent trial and appellate
court review of the sufficiency of the evidence already provides a cer-
tain degree of protection to criminal defendants.38
B. The California Approach
In most situations involving inconsistent jury verdicts, California
follows the federal rule that verdict inconsistency does not constitute a
ground for the reversal of a conviction. Section 954 of the California
Penal Code provides, in part, that "[a]n acquittal of one or more
counts [set forth in the accusatory pleading] shall not be deemed an
acquittal of any other count."' 39 California courts consistently inter-
pret this portion of the provision to mean "that each count in an in-
dictment or information, which charges a separate and distinct offense
must stand upon its own merit, and that a verdict of either conviction
or acquittal upon one such charge has no effect or bearing upon other
separate counts which are contained therein." 40 Accordingly, where
the weight of the evidence supports a conviction, the guilty verdict
stands despite the existence of an apparently inconsistent verdict of
acquittal. 41
California recognizes one exception to the general proposition
that inconsistency affords no basis for reversal:
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 66.
38. Id. at 67.
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1985).
40. People v. Ranney, 123 Cal. App. 403, 407, 11 P.2d 405, 406 (1932); see People
v. Amick, 20 Cal. 2d 247, 252, 125 P.2d 25, 28 (1942); People v. Walker, 146 Cal.
App. 3d 34, 38, 193 Cal. Rptr. 834, 836 (1983); People v. Federico, 127 Cal. App. 3d
20, 32, 179 Cal. Rptr. 315, 322 (1981); People v. Hamilton, 80 Cal. App. 3d 124, 129-
30, 145 Cal. Rptr. 429, 432 (1978); People v. Calpito, 9 Cal. App. 3d 212, 219, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 64, 67-68 (1970).
41. Hamilton, 80 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 432; see Walker, 146 Cal.
App. 3d at 38, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
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[Inconsistency invalidates a conviction] where all of the essential
elements of the crime of which the defendant was acquitted are
identical to some or all of the essential elements of the crime of
which he was convicted, and proof of the crime of which the de-
fendant was acquitted is necessary to sustain a conviction of the
crime of which the defendant was found guilty.4 2
Thus, in deciding whether to reverse a conviction on the basis of ver-
dict inconsistency, California courts limit their inquiry to the elements
of the crimes charged. 43
Few verdicts demonstrate the type of inconsistency required for
reversal in California. One of the rare instances in which inconsis-
tency provides a basis for reversal occurs when a defendant is found
guilty of conspiracy but innocent of all crimes alleged to be overt acts
of the conspiracy.44 Such cases fulfill both of the conditions previously
discussed. First, the essential elements of the conspiracy charge neces-
sarily include all essential elements of the crimes alleged to be the
overt acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Second, the
prosecution must prove the commission of at least one of these overt
acts to sustain a conviction of conspiracy.45
An acquittal on one or more charges in a multiple count indict-
ment necessarily decides certain issues in favor of the defendant. Ac-
cordingly, the reversal of a conviction due to inconsistency with an
acquittal raises the issue of the propriety of relitigating the conviction.
Under California law, collateral estoppel bars the reconsideration of
an issue litigated at a prior criminal trial when:
1. the issue necessarily decided at the previous trial is identical to
the one which is sought to be relitigated;...
2. the previous trial resulted in a final judgment on the merits;
and...
42. Hamilton, 80 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 432; see Walker, 146 Cal.
App. 3d at 38, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 836; Federico, 127 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 179 Cal. Rptr.
at 322-23. Powell made it clear that this exception is not available under the federal
rule. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
43. See Hamilton, 80 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 432. In Hamilton,
the court noted that even if the defendant's conviction of felony hit-and-run driving
could not be factually supported absent a finding that he had participated in either a
speed contest or speed exhibition, acquittal on the two speed offenses did not bring
him within the exception to section 954 of the California Penal Code. Section 954
permitted such "inconsistency" because the essential elements of the two speed of-
fenses differed from the essential elements of felony hit-and-run driving. Id. at 130-31,
145 Cal. Rptr. at 432. But cf People v. Simmons, 82 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 481 (1978) (court suggested that exception to section 954 is appropriate when
irreconcilable inconsistency exists even if elements of crimes charged not identical).
44. See In re Johnston, 3 Cal. 2d 32, 43 P.2d 541 (1935); Oliver v. Superior Court,
92 Cal. App. 94, 267 P. 764 (1928); see also Hamilton, 80 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 145
Cal. Rptr. at 432 (noting that acquittal on overt act of conspiracy provides basis for
reversal of conspiracy conviction).
45. Oliver, 92 Cal. App. at 97, 267 P. at 765.
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3. the party against whom collateral estoppel is assessed was a
party or in privity with a party at the prior trial.
46
Cases reversed because of verdict inconsistency should satisfy the
criteria for the application of collateral estoppel.47 First, California
courts will upset a conviction only when one or more verdicts of ac-
quittal returned by the jury negative an essential element of the crime
of which the defendant was found guilty.48 A retrial of the conviction
would, therefore, necessarily raise issues decided by the prior acquit-
tal. The prosecution could not relitigate the conviction without alleg-
ing all essential elements of the crime. Second, absent extraordinary
circumstances, an acquittal at the trial level would stand as a final
judgment on the merits. The fifth amendment's prohibition against
double jeopardy mandates such a result.4 9 Finally, the state, the party
to be bound by the estoppel, did participate in the prior trial.5 0
III. THE TREATMENT OF INCONSISTENT JURY
VERDICTS IN ALASKA
A. DeSacia v. State
The Alaska Supreme Court first addressed the issue of verdict
inconsistency and its effect upon the jury's findings in DeSacia v.
State. 5 1 After thorough consideration, the court decided that Alaska
should stand among those states that reject the federal rule, at least
when the case involves strictly inconsistent verdicts. In addition to
analyzing the rationale behind the Dunn holding, DeSacia discussed
many procedural and substantive "sub-issues" that require attention
when inconsistency infects a jury verdict.
Both counts of the indictment charged DeSacia with manslaugh-
ter.5 2 The evidence introduced in support of each count tended to
show that by his careless operation of a motor vehicle, DeSacia forced
46. People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. 3d 686, 691, 527 P.2d 622, 625, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70, 73
(1974); see People v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 494, 501, 118 Cal. Rptr. 702,
706 (1975).
47. Two cases decided prior to Taylor provide support for this conclusion. In
both In re Johnston, 3 Cal. 2d 32, 43 P.2d 541 (1935), and Oliver v. Superior Court,
92 Cal. App. 94, 267 P. 764 (1928), the courts proscribed further prosecution of the
defendant after reversing a criminal conspiracy conviction because the jury had re-
turned an acquittal on all overt acts of the conspiracy. This conclusion also comports
with federal law. See supra note 33.
48. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
50. People v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 501, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
51. 469 P.2d 369 (Alaska 1970).
52. Id. at 370. The manslaughter statute under which DeSacia was indicted was
former ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.040 (1962) (codified as amended by 1978 Alaska Sess.
Laws, ch. 166, § 3, at ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (1983)).
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a Ford Ranchero and its occupants into the Chena River. The driver
of the Ranchero and one of his passengers died as a result of the acci-
dent. Despite the virtually identical evidence presented by the prose-
cution on both counts, the jury found the defendant guilty of the
manslaughter of the driver and not guilty of the manslaughter of the
passenger.5 3
Faced with these conflicting verdicts, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that "strictly inconsistent" verdicts, such as the ones at bar, could
not stand.54 The court disagreed with the assumption in Dunn that
many, if not all, inconsistent verdicts result from jury leniency.55 In
the court's view, inconsistent verdicts could also be attributable to,
among other things, compromise or confusion. The court stated that
it had "no reliable way to discover what really lies behind the inconsis-
tent verdicts; and any conclusions - any assumptions on our part -
would not be warranted."'56 Instead of speculating as to the jury's
thought processes, the court limited its inquiry to the rationality of the
result. The court noted that each count of the indictment charged
DeSacia with identical conduct and with the same degree of culpabil-
ity toward the vehicle in which both victims were riding. DeSacia
could not, therefore, have been more negligent toward one victim than
the other. In light of the fact that the acquittal and conviction of man-
slaughter, when viewed together, displayed irrational inconsistencies,
the court reversed the defendant's conviction and ordered a new trial
on the charges included in the overturned conviction. The court
"[could] conceive of no reason why, under [the] circumstances, [it
could not] require at the very least, a minimal degree of reasonableness
in the rendering of jury verdicts."'57
Because Alaska's position encourages defendants to appeal on the
grounds of verdict inconsistency and provides for a retrial when an
appeal succeeds, the DeSacia opinion necessarily addressed a number
of issues that jurisdictions following the federal rule need not consider.
These issues are discussed in the following subsections.
1. When must a defendant challenge the consistency of the verdicts?
In DeSacia, the state contended that the defendant lost his right to
53. DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 371. The evidence differed only as to the medical cause
of death of the driver of the Ranchero and his passenger, which had "no bearing
whatsoever on the elements of the crime charged." Id. at 374.
54. Id. at 378. It appears that the DeSacia court used the phrases "strictly incon-
sistent" and "irreconcilably inconsistent" interchangeably. Subsequent Alaska opin-
ions appear to have done the same. These phrases will, therefore, be used
interchangeably in this note.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 24 & 36.




appeal when he failed to make a timely motion for acquittal before
seeking a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Under the laws of
Alaska, a motion for acquittal could only have been made at the close
of the state's evidence or at the close of the defendant's evidence.
58
The court rejected the state's argument because it would require de-
fendants to raise the issue of inconsistency before the jury returns the
verdicts and before any inconsistency could possibly exist.59 Thus,
under DeSacia, a defendant need not challenge verdict inconsistency
until the jury returns its verdict.
2. What is the significance of a defendant's failure to make timely
objections to jury instructions that facilitate the return of inconsistent
verdicts? DeSacia made it clear that if the error in accepting the ver-
dicts is plain, Criminal Rule 47(b)60 permits a defendant to appeal his
conviction even though he did not voice objection to a disputed jury
instruction at trial.61 "A plain error is one that is obvious and prejudi-
cial."' 62 The court provided less guidance as to the result in a case not
involving plain error. It left open the question of when, in such a case,
failure to make a timely objection to jury instructions that permit in-
consistencies to arise forecloses an appeal.
In DeSacia, the state argued that the defendant's failure to object
to a certain instruction foreclosed consideration of his appeal. 63 To
support its position, the state cited cases standing for the proposition
that absent a timely objection to instructions facilitating inconsistency,
a defendant's objections do not deserve notice on appeal.64 Although
these cases had little, if any, influence on the holding in DeSacia be-
cause of the finding of plain error, they led the court to identify two
pertinent areas of inquiry for future cases. First, did the "overwhelm-
ing weight of the evidence" show the defendant's guilt?65 Second, did
the instruction given to the jury specifically state that the court would
58. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 29.
59. DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 372-73.
60. Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 47(b) provides that "plain errors or de-
fects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the court."
61. DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 373.
62. Davis v. State, 684 P.2d 147, 150 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
63. DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 373. The controversial instruction provided:
You will note that a separate and distinct crime is charged in each Count of
the Indictment. Each crime and the evidence applicable thereto should be
considered separately. Your verdict with respect to either one of the crimes
charged should in no way influence or control your verdict with respect to
the other crime charged.
Id. at 373 n.7.
64. Id. at 373 n.6.
65. Id. at 373.
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accept inconsistent verdicts? 66 If the court can answer either, or both,
of the questions in the affirmative and the defendant failed to object to
the disputed instruction at trial, the DeSacia opinion arguably implies
that disallowance of the appeal may be appropriate where plain error
does not exist.
3. What effect does a finding of inconsistency have on the verdict(s)
of acquittal? In DeSacia, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that
all verdicts of acquittal must stand.67 The court held that retrying the
counts upon which the defendant had been acquitted would violate the
double jeopardy clause in the constitutions of the United States and
Alaska.6 8 Only one year prior to DeSacia, the United States Supreme
Court had declared that the fifth amendment's proscription of double
jeopardy applied to the states.6 9 In light of this declaration, the
DeSacia court found Green v. United States70 controlling. The
Supreme Court had stated in Green that "it is one of the elemental
principles of our criminal law that the Government cannot secure a
new trial by means of an appeal even though an acquittal may appear
to be erroneous. ' 71 A defendant does not waive the protections af-
forded by the double jeopardy clause when he appeals a conviction on
another charge. 72
4. May the court remand the reversed conviction for retrial? When
confronting the issue of whether a court can remand a reversed con-
viction for retrial, the DeSacia court recognized that collateral estop-
pel arguably could preclude a retrial because "the state would have to
adduce essentially the same evidence which was ruled upon when
DeSacia was acquitted on Count 1.1173 At the time that DeSacia was
66. Id. The DeSacia court answered both of these questions in the negative. Id.
Note, however, that an affirmative answer to the second inquiry would indicate that
the trial judge had expressly told the jury that it could return inconsistent verdicts.
Such an instruction would probably constitute plain error, permitting the court to
hear the appeal despite the defendant's failure to object. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 47(b).
67. DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 378.
68. Id. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in perti-
nent part: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Alaska Constitution similarly
provides that: "No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense."
ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 9.
69. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
70. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
71. Id. at 188.
72. Id. at 191-98.
73. 469 P.2d at 379. The court summarily dismissed the proposition that double
jeopardy might preclude a retrial of the reversed conviction. When a defendant ap-
peals his conviction, he waives his right to the double jeopardy defense with respect to
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decided, Alaska law provided that collateral estoppel applied in crimi-
nal as well as civil matters to prevent the relitigation of issues validly
and finally resolved by a jury.74 In addition, the United States
Supreme Court had recently given collateral estoppel constitutional
significance by holding that it was "embodied" in the guarantee
against double jeopardy. 75
After noting a lack of precedent, the DeSacia court stated that it
would follow the Supreme Court's suggestion in Ashe v. Swenson 76 to
use "realism and rationality" in the application of collateral estoppel
instead of the "hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th Century
pleading book."'77 This "realism" led the court to conclude that ver-
dict inconsistency casts doubt upon the acquittal as well as the convic-
tion. Because collateral estoppel only precludes the relitigation of
issues of fact that the court "confidently" feels were decided in the
prior acquittal, the doctrine was held not to prohibit retrial of the
conviction.78
The court also stressed the "fairness" of its decision not to apply
collateral estoppel. In the court's view, conducting a retrial would not
unduly harass or prejudice the defendant. The court likened this case
to any other in which a retrial follows a successful appeal.79 On the
other hand, disallowance of a retrial would tip the balance too heavily
in favor of the defendant. Allowing the defendant to question the va-
lidity of the verdicts returned by the jury and "to argue, in the same
breath, that his acquittal is of sufficient certainty to suit the purposes
of collateral estoppel" would severely prejudice the state.80
B. Inconsistent Verdicts After DeSacia
Since DeSacia, a number of cases involving claims of inconsistent
jury verdicts have reached the Alaska courts.81 In none of these cases
has the deciding court questioned the underlying rationale behind the
DeSacia holding. Indeed, the decisions uniformly adhere to the notion
that the court has a right to require reasonableness in jury verdicts.
all charges included in that conviction. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671-72
(1896).
74. See Dapcevich v. State, 360 P.2d 789 (Alaska 1961).
75. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970).
76. 397 U.S. 436.
77. DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 380 (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444).
78. Id. at 380-81.
79. Id. at 381.
80. Id.
81. Davenport v. State, 543 P.2d 1204 (Alaska 1975); Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d
1159 (Alaska 1973); Davis v. State, 684 P.2d 147 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Roberts v.




Alaska courts typically consider whether, based on the facts at hand,
an irreconcilable conflict exists between an acquittal and a conviction
that compels reversal of the conviction.8 2 A number of the "sub-is-
sues" highlighted in DeSacia have also received attention.
1. Procedural "Sub-Issues." The Alaska Court of Appeals dis-
cussed the issue of the proper time to object to inconsistent verdicts in
Roberts v. State8 3 and Davis v. State. 8 4 In Roberts, the court of appeals
outlined a two-step test which it subsequently applied in Davis. Under
this test, the court first determines whether the defendant communi-
cated his complaints regarding the verdicts to the trial court. Gener-
ally, an appellate court will not hear an appeal based on the existence
of inconsistency between verdicts unless the defendant raises objection
to the inconsistency before the trial court discharges the jury.8 5 If the
defendant fails to render a timely objection, the court proceeds to the
second step, which involves an appraisal of the degree of the alleged
inconsistency. When verdicts are obviously inconsistent and "appel-
late review is necessary to prevent manifest injustice," Criminal Rule
47(b) 6 applies and the court may consider the appeal regardless of the
lack of timely objection to the verdicts.8 7 "The meaning of Criminal
Rule 47(b) is that [the court] may consider questions raised for the
first time on appeal if necessary to effect substantial justice or prevent
the denial of fundamental rights."88
The difference between an irreconcilable inconsistency and an ob-
vious inconsistency is vague. The Davis and Roberts opinions pro-
ceeded on the assumption that a distinction may be drawn between the
two types of inconsistencies, but failed to set forth any distinguishing
factors.89 Despite the lack of clearly articulated standards in this area,
82. See, e.g., Davis, 684 P.2d 147.
83. 680 P.2d 503 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
84. 684 P.2d 147 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
85. Roberts, 680 P.2d at 507. The Roberts court repeatedly stressed the reason-
ableness of this test:
[The requirement of a timely objection seems less onerous in the context of
inconsistent verdicts than with most claims of error arising during a trial.
Unlike evidentiary rulings, which require an immediate objection in mid-
trial, counsel will normally have ample opportunity to anticipate and call to
the court's attention - either in proposing jury instructions or after final
arguments, while the jury is deliberating - any possibility of inconsistent
jury verdicts.
Id. at 507 n.1l.
86. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 47(b), quoted supra note 60.
87. Roberts, 680 P.2d at 507.
88. DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 373 (quoting Hammonds v. State, 442 P.2d 39, 43
(Alaska 1968)).
89. First, the Davis court held that the verdicts were irreconcilably inconsistent.
684 P.2d at 149. Mere irreconcilability did not, however, justify consideration of the
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a close analysis of Alaska case law yields the following conclusions.
First, the obviousness requirement only applies when the defendant
fails to make a timely objection at trial to the inconsistent verdicts.90
Second, if proof of the alleged inconsistency depends on a detailed ex-
amination of the facts and circumstances of the case, the court is not
likely to find the requisite "obviousness." 91 Only readily apparent in-
consistencies are apt to be labeled obvious. This is most likely to occur
where the elements of the crimes charged are identical.
In applying this two-tiered test, the court of appeals expanded
upon DeSacia. The DeSacia court unequivocally rejected as "anoma-
lous" the state's proposal that the defendant be required to challenge
verdict consistency prior to the return of inconsistent verdicts.92 In
addition, the DeSacia court recognized that failure to make any objec-
tion was irrelevant in cases involving plain error.93 The Alaska
Supreme Court did not, however, provide clear guidance as to when
an objection is timely. The Roberts court filled this gap by holding
that a timely objection to potential inconsistency is one raised prior to
the discharge of the jury.94 If this issue arises before the supreme
court, the court will likely approve the Roberts test. The Roberts test
adequately addresses the Alaska Supreme Court's concern over the
"anomalous" requirement that the defendant question verdict consis-
tency prior to the return of a verdict.95 In addition, the Alaska
Supreme Court has consistently maintained that civil litigants must
object to potential inconsistency prior to the discharge of the jury.96
Roberts also discussed the issue of failure to object to jury instruc-
tions. According to Roberts, when the defendant fails to object to in-
structions likely to promote inconsistent verdicts, the actions of
defendant's trial counsel also influence the court's decision on whether
appeal. Because the defendant had failed to object to the inconsistency prior to the
discharge of the jury, the court then proceeded to examine the "obviousness" of the
inconsistency. Only after both findings did the court agree to entertain defendant's
appeal. See id. at 150.
The Roberts court found "the question of inconsistency.., to be a close one," but
declined to consider the defendant's appeal because the verdict was not obvious and
the defendant had failed to preserve the inconsistency issue properly. 680 P.2d at 504-
06.
90. See Roberts, 680 P.2d at 507.
91. See id. at 505-06.
92. DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 372-73; see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
93. 469 P.2d at 373.
94. 680 P.2d at 507.
95. For further discussion of the DeSacia court's concern over the requirement
that a defendant question consistency prior to the return of a verdict, see supra notes
58-59 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., City of Fairbanks v. Smith, 525 P.2d 1095, 1097-98 (Alaska 1974);
Nordin Constr. Co. v. City of Nome, 489 P.2d 455, 472 (Alaska 1971); City of Homer
v. Land's End Marine, 459 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Alaska 1969).
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to entertain an appeal. If trial counsel, as in Roberts, tells the jury
during closing arguments that they should decide each count sepa-
rately and that guilt on one charge does not preclude acquittal on the
other, "[the defendant] is in a poor position to complain of any incon-
sistency [after the discharge of the jury]." 97 Once again the court of
appeals has articulated a criterion that the Alaska Supreme Court, if
given the opportunity, will likely adopt. Weighing trial counsel's ac-
tions when determining whether the defendant justifiably failed to ob-
ject to certain jury instructions is entirely commensurate with
DeSacia. It also seems inherently fair.
2. Avoidance and Reconciliation of Inconsistent Verdicts. The per-
tinent cases following DeSacia clearly indicate that only a high level of
inconsistency will persuade the court to order the reversal and retrial
of a conviction. Attempts to reconcile and to avoid inconsistent ver-
dicts will be made by the court. 98 Gravel v. State99 illustrates the
lengths to which a trial court may go to avoid the jury's return of
inconsistent verdicts.
In Gravel, the trial court found the first verdicts returned by the
jury to be inconsistent and asked the jury to reconsider. The jury then
returned consistent verdicts, but because polling of the jurors revealed
disagreement, the court once again requested that the jury continue to
deliberate. After further consideration, the jury returned unanimous
and consistent verdicts.
The Supreme Court of Alaska approved of the methods used by
the trial court to attain "legally valid verdicts." 100 The court declared
that the trial judge is obligated to assure that the jury return a valid
verdict whenever he may do so without unduly influencing the jury. 0 1
The lack of coercive force on the part of the trial judge and defense
counsel's acquiescence at trial constituted significant factors in the
court's holding.'0 2
Most of the inconsistency claims arising in Alaska since DeSacia
have been resolved through the process of reconciliation. 03 Reconcili-
ation involves two interrelated steps. First, the court carefully ana-
lyzes the facts and circumstances of the case. Second, the court
97. Roberts, 680 P.2d at 507.
98. See Davenport v. State, 543 P.2d 1204 (Alaska 1975); Gravel v. State, 499
P.2d 1022 (Alaska 1972); Davis v. State, 684 P.2d 147 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Rob-
erts, 680 P.2d 503; Born v. State, 633 P.2d 1021 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981).
99. 499 P.2d 1022 (Alaska 1972).
100. Id. at 1024.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1024-25.
103. See, e.g., Davenport, 543 P.2d at 1207-08; Born, 633 P.2d at 1023-25; Daygee
v. State, 514 P.2d 1159, 1167-68 (Alaska 1973). This statement refers only to those
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attempts to reconcile the "inconsistent verdicts" with these facts and
circumstances. In attempting to reconcile verdicts, the court examines
the total picture, not just the facial consistency between verdicts. If
this process discloses any facts or circumstances upon which the jury
rationally could have based its conclusions, the verdict stands.104
The Alaska Supreme Court reconciled seemingly inconsistent
verdicts in Davenport v. State. 105 Davenport, whose liability depended
on an accomplice theory, was charged with three counts of armed rob-
bery. Each count related to the unlawful taking of different pieces of
property during the commission of the robbery. The jury returned a
conviction on counts one and two and an acquittal on count three.
Despite the variance between the verdicts, the court believed that the
jury acted rationally. An analysis of the record disclosed that while
the state offered direct evidence with respect to the allegations con-
tained in counts one and two, the state presented only circumstantial
evidence to support the charges set forth in count three. 10 6 In the
court's opinion, the variance between the verdicts coincided with the
difference in the types of evidence presented by the state. Moreover,
"there is nothing inconsistent about finding a defendant guilty of steal-
ing one piece of property, but not another."' 10 7
3. Davis v. State: The Only Post-DeSacia Case with an Irreconcila-
ble Inconsistency. Davis v. State 108 is the only criminal case decided
after DeSacia in which an Alaska appellate court has found an irrec-
oncilable inconsistency between verdicts. All criminal charges in Da-
vis arose out of a collision between an automobile operated by the
defendant and a pickup truck operated by Albert Robertson. The
prosecution alleged that the defendant's reckless operation of his mo-
tor vehicle caused the death of Edward Wilson, a passenger in the
Robertson truck, and serious physical injury to Robertson. The jury
convicted the defendant of criminally negligent homicide' 0 9 with re-
spect to Wilson and of reckless endangerment 010 with respect to Rob-
ertson. The jury, however, acquitted Davis on the charge of second
cases in which Alaska courts have entertained an appeal on the grounds of verdict
inconsistency. Cases such as Roberts, where the court declined to hear the defendant's
objections, are excluded.
104. See Davenport, 543 P.2d at 1207-08.
105. 543 P.2d 1204 (Alaska 1975).
106. Id. at 1208.
107. Id.
108. 684 P.2d 147 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
109. Davis, 684 P.2d at 148; see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.130 (1983).
110. Davis, 684 P.2d at 148; see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.250 (1983).
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degree assault11 a upon Robertson, as well as the lesser included offense
of fourth degree assault1 2 upon Robertson.
Faced with the above scenario, the court acknowledged that the
defendant justifiably questioned the consistency of the verdicts. By
finding the defendant guilty of negligent homicide and not guilty of
assault, the jury had, in effect, indicated that the collision caused Wil-
son's death but not Robertson's injuries. After analyzing the elements
of the crimes involved, the court concluded that the verdicts were ir-
reconcilably inconsistent. Under Alaska law, fourth degree assault oc-
curs when, with criminal negligence, one causes serious physical injury
to another by means of a dangerous instrumentality. 13 Criminally
negligent homicide occurs when, with criminal negligence, one causes
the death of another.114 By convicting the defendant on the homicide
charge, the jury necessarily found that the defendant acted in a crimi-
nally negligent manner. In addition, "the jury must have found that
the vehicle, used as it was, was capable of causing death or serious
physical injury." 115 The vehicle, therefore, constituted a dangerous in-
strument and the defendant's criminal negligence clearly caused the
serious physical injury to Robertson.116 Because all elements neces-
sary for a conviction of assault were present, the jury had acted irra-
tionally in acquitting the defendant of assault.
This irreconcilable inconsistency did not, by itself, provide ade-
quate grounds for reversal because the defendant had failed to make a
timely objection to the verdicts at the trial level. The defendant would
prevail only if the inconsistency met the obviousness standard articu-
lated in Roberts.117 In the Davis court's view, "the verdicts, which
reflect[ed] a conclusion that Davis caused Wilson's death but did not
cause Robertson's injuries, [were] so obviously inconsistent that they
satisflied] the plain error test."11 8 Davis, therefore, was entitled to re-
lief despite his failure to object to the verdicts during trial. Uncer-
tainty as to the extent of the jury's confusion led the court to grant
relief in the form of a reversal and retrial of both convictions. The
court felt that confusion could have infected the jury's determination
111. Davis, 684 P.2d at 149; see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.210 (1983).
112. Davis, 684 P.2d at 149; see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.230 (1983).
113. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.230(2) (1983).
114. Id. § 11.41.130 (1983).
115. Davis, 684 P.2d at 149.
116. The discrepancy between verdicts could not rest on lack of injury because the
evidence clearly proved that Robertson suffered serious physical injury in the
accident.
117. Davis, 684 P.2d at 149-50. For a discussion of the obviousness standard, see
supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
118. Davis, 684 P.2d at 150.
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of the defendant's responsibility for the death of Wilson as well as for
the injuries sustained by Robertson. 19
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT ALASKA APPROACH TO
INCONSISTENT JURY VERDICTS
A sound rationale underlies the DeSacia holding that strictly in-
consistent verdicts may not stand. A number of other jurisdictions
have espoused the view that requiring a minimal degree of rationality
in the rendering of jury verdicts is quite reasonable. 120 As recognized
in DeSacia, adherence to the federal rule calls for the application of
questionable assumptions as to the jury's thought processes.121 Alaska
justifiably refuses to engage in such speculation.
The justifiability of the basic premise of DeSacia, however, does
not render Alaska's treatment of inconsistent verdicts completely ac-
ceptable. A careful examination of Alaska case law reveals a number
of weaknesses in Alaska's current approach, including the following:
(1) Alaska lacks reasonably clear standards for determining when jury
verdicts reach the strictly inconsistent level; (2) reconciliation, a neces-
sary corollary to the strictly inconsistent standard, is a cumbersome
process that prevents the summary disposal of cases and increases the
probability that Alaska courts will decide similar cases differently; (3)
Alaska courts have failed adequately to define "obvious inconsis-
tency"; and (4) Alaska's position on the applicability of collateral es-
toppel in cases such as DeSacia arguably violates the federal
Constitution.
Lack of reasonably clear standards for determining whether jury
verdicts are strictly inconsistent constitutes a significant shortcoming
in Alaska's current approach to verdict inconsistency. The only gui-
dance for litigants comes from the frequently repeated assertion that
verdicts subject to reconciliation fail to qualify as "strictly inconsis-
tent." Important questions remain as to how strained the reconcilia-
tion may be. The lack of guidance increases the potential for
excessive, unwarranted appeals on the basis of verdict inconsistency.
If Alaska courts had narrowly construed the DeSacia opinion,
much of the uncertainty surrounding the definition of "strictly incon-
sistent" would not exist. DeSacia can be read as holding that a verdict
119. Id. Permitting a retrial of both convictions does not appear to violate the
constitutions of the United States or Alaska. In fact, the disposition of this case fa-
vored the defendant.
120. See supra note 9.




reaches the "strictly inconsistent" level only when both of the follow-
ing conditions exist: (1) the elements of the crimes charged are identi-
cal,122 and (2) the evidence bearing on the elements of the crimes
charged is identical for each of the alleged inconsistent verdicts. 123
This interpretation establishes a threshold requirement that the ele-
ments of the crimes charged be identical. The court need conduct fur-
ther analysis only after finding that the case satisfies this easily
discernible requirement.
Reconciliation is a necessary corollary to Alaska's use of the
strictly inconsistent standard. Under current law, the court must con-
duct a thorough analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case in
order to determine whether they are reconcilable with the apparently
inconsistent verdicts. This cumbersome process delays the disposition
of cases warranting summary disposal and increases the probability
that similar cases will be decided differently. Adoption of a more
workable definition of strictly inconsistent would alleviate these
problems.
Alaska courts have also failed to particularize the factors that
make a verdict obviously inconsistent. This failure, in conjunction
with the absence of a workable definition for "strictly inconsistent,"
renders attempts to distinguish between a strict inconsistency and an
obvious inconsistency tenuous at best. This distinction assumes criti-
cal significance for litigants who fail to make a timely objection to
inconsistencies at the trial level.
Permitting a retrial of the reversed conviction represents another
troublesome aspect of the current Alaska approach. Because this
topic has been extensively covered in a prior note, little discussion will
be included here.124 Alaska's current practice of permitting retrials of
convictions reversed on grounds of inconsistency may violate the
double jeopardy clause of the federal Constitution. The United States
Supreme Court has held that the guarantee against double jeopardy
embodies collateral estoppel and therefore precludes a retrial when the
122. See DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 374 ("It is obvious that the two counts of the indict-
ment in this case charged DeSacia with identical conduct and with the same element
of negligence. They differed only in that a different person was named as the victim in
each instance.").
123. See id. (evidence differed only as to medical cause of death which court con-
sidered irrelevant).
A final condition, not explicitly recognized in DeSacia but automatically required
in all cases, is that the evidence in the record must sufficiently support a finding of
guilt. If this threshold requirement is not met, the conviction can be reversed for
insufficient evidence and the issue of inconsistency need never arise.
124. Case Comment, Inconsistent Verdicts in a Criminal Case: A Comment on
DeSacia v. State, 9 ALASKA L.J. 130 (May 1971).
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retrial would involve the litigation of issues decided by a prior acquit-
tal.125 The DeSacia court permitted the state to retry the defendant
after the reversal of his conviction despite the fact that the second trial
would relitigate issues encompassed in the defendant's prior acquit-
tal.126 The court explained that a contrary rule would be unfair to the
state. 27 This rule, however, fails to recognize the supremacy of the
federal Constitution.
The DeSacia court also arguably distorted the holding in Ashe v.
Swenson, ' 28 one of the few cases allegedly supporting the fairness ap-
proach to the application of collateral estoppel, by using a quote from
Ashe out of context. The Ashe quote stated, in pertinent part, that
"collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the
hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book,
but with realism and rationality."' 129 Immediately after making this
admonition, however, the Ashe Court noted that the relevant inquiry
was "whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an
issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from con-
sideration."' 30 By the DeSacia court's own admission, the issues in
both counts of the DeSacia indictment were identical. 31 Thus, the
jury necessarily grounded its verdict of acquittal upon an issue that the
defendant sought to foreclose from appeal and collateral estoppel
should have been held to preclude a retrial.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
As the above discussion illustrates, Alaska needs to clarify its po-
sition with respect to inconsistent jury verdicts. Alaska courts, as well
as litigants, would benefit from the introduction of clear guidelines.
To this end, Alaska should adopt one of two alternative approaches.
The first alternative calls for the Alaska Supreme Court to declare
that it will narrowly construe the DeSacia holding, especially the
strictly inconsistent standard. When next presented with the issue of
verdict inconsistency, the Alaska Supreme Court should stress the
continuing validity of the DeSacia opinion and hold that the case
stands for the proposition that verdicts reach the strictly inconsistent
level only when both of the following conditions are met: (1) the ele-
ments of the crimes charged are identical, and (2) the evidence bearing
125. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443-46 (1970).
126. DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 379-82.
127. For a discussion of the DeSacia fairness rationale, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 79-80.
128. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
129. Id. at 444; see supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
130. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444.
131. 469 P.2d at 373-74.
1986]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
on the elements of the crimes charged is identical for each of the al-
leged inconsistent verdicts.132
The second alternative provides for the legislative enactment of a
provision similar to section 954 of the California Penal Code. 133 In
effect, the Alaska legislature should provide that an acquittal on one
or more counts does not constitute an acquittal on any other count.
Accordingly, where the weight of the evidence supports a conviction, a
guilty verdict stands despite the existence of an apparently inconsistent
verdict of acquittal. The Alaska legislature should also adopt an im-
portant exception to this general proposition. Inconsistency should in-
validate a conviction where both of the following conditions are met:
[All] of the essential elements of the crime of which the defendant
was acquitted are identical to some or all of the essential elements of
the crime of which he was convicted, and proof of the crime of
which the defendant was acquitted is necessary to sustain a convic-
tion of the crime of which the defendant was found guilty.' 34
Both alternatives provide precise and workable guidelines for de-
termining when inconsistency affords the reversal of a conviction and
lower the risk that similar cases will be decided differently. Both ap-
proaches also eliminate the inherent difficulties in identifying an "obvi-
ous" inconsistency for purposes of determining whether an appellate
court should hear the appeal of a defendant who failed timely to object
to verdict inconsistency. Only "obvious" inconsistencies merit atten-
tion under the alternatives. That is, only those inconsistencies appar-
ent on the face of the record by examining the elements of the crimes
charged may be reversed.
For reasons previously discussed, under either suggested ap-
proach Alaska courts should hold that collateral estoppel precludes a
retrial on convictions overturned because of verdict inconsistency. 35
Both alternatives permit the invalidation of a conviction only where
132. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. Such a holding will directly
conflict with the decision of the Alaska Court of Appeals in Roberts. It does not
appear, however, that this new position will directly conflict with any Alaska Supreme
Court decision rendered since DeSacia.
If the first condition is viewed as too restrictive, a slight modification could be
made. The Alaska Supreme Court could hold that verdicts reach the strictly inconsis-
tent level only when the second condition is met and "all of the essential elements of
the crime of which the defendant was acquitted are identical to some or all of the
essential elements of the crime of which he was convicted." People v. Hamilton, 80
Cal. App. 3d 124, 130, 145 Cal. Rptr. 429, 432 (1978). An analysis of the case law
suggests that Alaska courts may, in fact, have implicitly adopted such a standard.
Unless this standard is explicitly stated, however, the shortcomings of Alaska's cur-
rent approach will continue to plague this area of the law.
133. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
134. Hamilton, 80 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
135. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
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the elements of the crimes charged are identical. At retrial, therefore,
the state would have to relitigate issues decided by the prior acquittal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Alaska has justifiably chosen to adhere to the principle that
strictly inconsistent verdicts may not stand. Now that this basic prem-
ise has gained widespread acceptance in the state, Alaska needs to
eliminate the ambiguities and deficiencies that continue to plague this
area of the law. To this end, Alaska should adopt one of the following
two approaches: (1) the Alaska Supreme Court should narrowly con-
strue the DeSacia holding, or (2) the Alaska legislature should enact a
statute that parallels the California approach to verdict inconsistency.
Adoption of either of these alternatives would permit Alaska to adhere
to the principle that strictly inconsistent verdicts may not stand, while
providing a workable framework for the application of that principle
to specific cases.
Amy L. Majewski
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